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The School of Hospitality Management, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA
ABSTRACT. This study aimed to examine a long-term motivation for franchising by
considering the influence of experience franchisors gain through conducting the franchising
strategy. The study mainly investigates the moderating effect of franchising experience on the
relationship between three main motivations for franchising (derived from agency theory,
resource scarcity theory, and risk-sharing theory) and firms’ degree of franchising in the
restaurant context. Dynamic panel data model was employed and the findings suggest that
not only do restaurant companies’ franchising experience positively affect firms’ degree of
franchising, but also that those experiences positively moderate the relationship between risksharing motivation and the degree of franchising. The findings lead to theoretical and practical
implications and suggestions for future research.

INTRODUCTION

the propensity to franchise from franchisors’
perspective. We used dynamic panel data
model (i.e., time-series data analysis combined
with panel data estimation) to offer empirical
evidence that franchising experience positively
motivates franchisors to increase the degree
of franchising and positively affects the effect
of risk-sharing motivation on the degree of
franchising.
Popularity of franchising in the business
contexts reflects many scholars’ research that
identify the key reasons for franchising’s
emergence and continued implementation
for more than decades (Combs et al., 2011;
Dant & Kaufmann, 2003; Dant, Paswan, &
Kaufmann, 1996; Hunt, 1973; Lafontaine,
1992). However, previous studies assumed
that motivations for franchisors to franchise
would affect franchising’s implementation with
the same magnitude regardless of firms’ different
experiences with the strategy. Little consideration has been given to the effect of the
franchising experiences on motivations for
increasing or continuing the franchising strategy.
Specifically, some factors may more dominantly

Franchising is an attractive strategy for
many different types of businesses by offering
opportunities for growth for both of franchisors
and franchisees (Combs & Ketchen, 2003;
Fladmoe-Lindquist, 1996). The agency theory
(i.e., reducing agency costs), resource scarcity
theory (i.e., using franchisees’ resources), and/
or risk-sharing theory (i.e., sharing risk with
franchisees) can explain motivations for franchisors to adopt a franchising strategy (Brickley
& Dark, 1987; Combs, Ketchen, Shook, &
Short, 2011; Hsu, Jang, & Canter, 2010; Roh,
2002). However, previous studies have focused
on the motivations with a static view and
have not considered the possibilities that the
importance of each motivation can change
depending on other business conditions
affecting firms, such as experience from
franchising. A thorough review on the previous
literature indicates that no study empirically
investigated the effect of franchising experience
on franchisors’ propensity to franchise and also
on the relation between the motivations and
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motivate firms to franchise at the initial stage
than at the later stage, whereas other factors may
motivate firms to continue or increase the level
of franchising as firms gain experience with the
strategy. On the basis of established theoretical
backgrounds of the motivations for franchising,
this study examines the role of franchising
experience on those motivations.
We examined the restaurant industry
because of its acceptance as a representative
industry of the franchising strategy (Combs,
Ketchen, & Hoover, 2004; Michael & Combs,
2008; Srinivasan, 2006). According to Anwer
(2011), among the several industries, which use
franchising as a primary strategy, the restaurant
industry ranks at the top encompassing 196
franchisors and 102,420 operated franchisees.
Considering the results of Anwer’s (2011) study,
the restaurant industry becomes significant
and influential for describing, characterizing,
and explaining the nature of franchising firms.
Moreover, the restaurant industry presents
some industry-specific characteristics that likely
influence the franchising strategy. Therefore,
the restaurant setting offers a unique opportunity to investigate a dynamic perspective of
franchising motivations, which, in turn, provides better understanding of the continuing
effectiveness of the franchising system.
Three features of restaurant firms characterize motivations for franchising: (a) restaurant
firms are generally small or mid-sized (Hsu
et al., 2010); (b) the restaurant industry is
characteristically risky (Slattery & Olsen, 1984)
and the assumption is that restaurant managers
are risk-averse in general; and (c) centralizing
production systems and ensuring essential onsite customer service is difficult for restaurant
firms (Safon & Escriba-Esteve, 2011). Considering these characteristics of the restaurant
industry, the agency theory, the resource
scarcity theory, and risk-sharing theory appear
to effectively explain restaurant firms’ motivations to franchise. According to the agency
theory, monitoring costs play an important role
as a major cost driver in the restaurant business
(Brickley & Dark, 1987; Hsu et al., 2010)
because the coinfluence of production and
consumption and the importance of service for
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on-site customers force restaurant firms to use
on-site managers through an entire network.
This involves significant costs for monitoring
hired managers throughout geographically
dispersed locations; therefore, reducing agency
costs can be a critical motivation for franchising
among restaurant firms. The resource scarcity
theory suggests that small- and mid-sized firms
are more likely to have few financial resources
needed to expand business. Acquiring
franchisees’ capital can be another important
motivation for franchising for firms experiencing resource scarcity (Lafontaine & Kaufmann,
1994). Last, high risk, a characteristic of the
restaurant industry, provides a strong motivation to franchise (Hsu et al., 2010; Roh, 2002)
because firms can share risks with franchisees,
creating an attractive motivation for the riskaverse restaurant managers. These three
motivations provide reasons for restaurant
firms’ heavy reliance on the franchising strategy
more so than any other industries.
Accompanying the three motivations to
franchise, the present study introduces a new
factor—franchising experience—to investigate
varying importance of motivations to franchise
at different stages of business over time.
Although all motivations require careful consideration during examination of franchising
implementation, overall, the importance of
each motivation may differ according to the
level of experience with franchising. This study
argues that building experience offers franchisors insight for interacting with franchisees
and for best use of the strategy for franchisors’
business models. Therefore, the accrued knowledge of the franchising strategy can influence
individual firm’s motivations for franchising.
Therefore, the main purpose of this study is to
empirically test (a) main effect of franchising
experience on franchising implementation and
(b) the moderating effect of franchising experience on the relation between three motivations
for franchising (i.e., reducing agency costs, using
others’ capital, and sharing risk) and franchising
implementation: How the magnitude of the
effect of each motivation on franchisors’
franchising implementation changes according
to differing degrees of experiences with
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franchising. This insight affords researchers’
comprehension of firms’ strategic movements
in the real world by broadening static views
to dynamic investigation of motivations for
franchising. The study also contributes to the
understanding of the consequences of franchising experiences on the decisions for establishing
a mix of ownerships (i.e., company-owned and
franchised outlets).
The remainder of this study provides an
overview of extant literature to identify know
motivations for franchising, and explains the
methodology to examine (a) the effect of
franchising experiences on the firms’ propensity to franchise and (b) the moderating effect
of that experience on the relation between
motivations for franchising and the degree of
franchising. Results and conclusion and discussions conclude the study.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Theoretical Background of Motivations
for Franchising
Agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) is
one of the most used theories (Brickley & Dark,
1987; Lafontaine, 1992; Rubin, 1978; Shane,
1998) and has the supports of numerous
empirical results (e.g., Brickley & Dark, 1987;
Brickely, Dark, & Weisbach, 1991; Hsu et al.,
2010) that describe the franchising strategy on
the basis of the relation between franchisor and
franchisee. According to the theory, the agency
problem arises from the conflicts of interests
between firms (principals) and managers (agents).
Because of the fixed compensation for managers,
difficulty arises for firms’ attempts to induce
managers’ best efforts, and consequently firms
expend monitoring costs to ensure managers
operate in the firms’ interest. This agency
problem is likely to be more serious for
restaurants since consumption and production
are inseparable and on-site service is critical for
successful business (Carman & Langeard, 1980;
Safon & Escriba-Esteve, 2011). However, franchising contracts can help firms overcome this
problem because franchisees and firms have
common interests in efficiently managing oper-

ations: Franchisees’ income is a direct result of
efficient management and determines earnings
from operations. Thus, the motivation exists for
firms to franchise, reducing the monitoring cost
through contracts with independent owners.
Resource scarcity theory also illuminates
incentives to franchise. Franchisors obtain
resources from franchisees as a return for
allowing them to use its trademark and service
trade. Further franchisors use that resource to
expand business when other sources, a shortage
of resources such as capital and knowledge of
the specific local area, are restrictions (Hunt,
1973; Norton, 1995; Oxenfeldt & Thompson,
1968). In other words, franchisees offer capital
in the form of franchising fees and royalties and
also provide not only physical assets but also
localized knowledge valuable for successful
operations (Lafontaine & Kaufmann, 1994).
These tangible and intangible assets allow
franchisors to accelerate growth, reserve cash,
and gain specific knowledge for future growth
(McGuire & Staelin, 1983; Minkler, 1992;
Norton, 1988; Shane, 1998). This arrangement
represents a significant advantage for restaurant
firms whose businesses are relatively small.
Because smaller firms are more likely to lack
resources to achieve the desired growth
(Hoover, Ketchen, & Combs, 2003; Hsu et al.,
2010; Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1969), franchising
offers restaurant firms opportunities to access
resources for growth.
Another perspective suggesting motivation to
franchise is the risk-sharing theory. Firms are likely
to decide to franchise outlets located in the
regions of expected higher risks to business or
where future performance is difficult to forecast.
This strategy shares risks with franchisees (Combs
& Castrogiovanni, 1994; Martin, 1988). Also,
relatively stable income received from franchising
fees and royalties mitigates franchisors’ risks by
reducing fluctuations in cash flow. In addition,
according to the Slattery and Olsen (1984),
the restaurant industry has the reputation of
vulnerability to volatile markets, characterizing
that particular industry as unstable and risky. This
unstable business environment may influences
restaurant franchisors to be risk-averse; therefore,
sharing risks with franchisees could represent
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an important motivation (Hsu et al., 2010; Roh,
2002).
These theories (i.e., agency theory, resource
scarcity theory, and risk-sharing theory) provide
a comprehensive description of the nature of
franchising and clarification of its important role
and its popularity. Various groups of scholars
have tested and supported the motivations:
however, previous research has maintained
only a stationary view. Specifically, studies did
not consider the possibility that some incentives
to franchise may become more or less attractive
as franchisors gain experiences by conducting
the strategy. Extending the research to establish
long-term motivations clarifies changes in
motivations’ importance at different stages of
the franchising experience. The short- and longterm motivations to franchise may not be the
same because a firm’s achievement of benefit
from using franchising (e.g., acquiring franchisees’ resources) may decline in importance,
while another or other benefits from franchising
may become more important as experience
increases. Therefore, investigating the dynamic
motivations to franchise from a long-term point
of view is a worthy endeavor.
Franchising Experience and its
Moderating Effect
From an organizational learning perspective, franchising experience likely plays a
significant role in deciding the direction of
firms’ strategic movement including whether to
continue or enlarge the degree of franchising
in the mix of ownerships. Arguably, operational
experience is an important source of competitive advantages to organizations, arising from
building a knowledge-base (Henderson, 1979;
Ingram & Baum, 1997). Ingram and Baum
(1997) found that franchisors are superior
learners because they efficiently share knowledge generated from experience throughout
franchised outlets. These results also implies
that franchisors benefit from interactions with
franchisees and that experience can provide
beneficial forum through feedback to the
franchisor for improving its business model.
Thus, the accumulated knowledge from fran-
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chising experiences may encourage firms to
increase the degree of franchising. Accordingly,
the present study hypothesizes a positive effect
of franchising experience on the degree of
franchising.
Hypothesis 1: Franchising experience has a
positive influence on the degree
of franchising.
Suggested by the agency theory, reducing
agency costs arising from monitoring hired
managers in dispersed outlets is an accepted
motivation for franchisors (Brickley & Dark,
1987; Hsu et al., 2010). In addition, when firms
decide whether to franchise or own new
outlets, franchising is the more likely choice,
if they are more experienced with franchising.
Reducing monitoring costs through franchising
becomes easier for experienced firms who have
access to the skills or know-how for managing
franchising systems. Franchisors become familiar with methods of communication with
franchisees, and the experience from franchising improves internal efficiency (Ingram &
Baum, 1997). Franchisors gain awareness of the
benefits reducing monitoring costs and gain
facility controlling the relations with franchisees. Therefore, this study proposes a positive
moderating effect of franchising experience on
the relation between the motivation from the
agency theory and the proportion of franchised
outlets to company-owned outlets.
Hypothesis 2: Franchising experience positively moderates the influence
of motivation derived from the
agency theory on the degree of
franchising.
Firms’ motivations to franchise also arise
from the franchisor’s need for capital (Caves
& Murphy, 1976; Dant & Kaufmann, 2003;
Kaufmann & Lafontaine, 1994; Norton, 1988;
Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1969), as attested to by
significant support by practitioners in the real
world. Franchising practitioners reported that
the single main reason for adopting franchising
is to conserve or acquire capital, and at the
same time, to attempt to expand an effective
distribution network as quickly as possible
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(McGuire, 1971). The implication of that report
is that this motivation represents a particularly
effective strategy for small- to mid-sized
restaurant firms. However, after firms grow
sufficiently through franchising, reaching
beneficial economies of scale and establishing
resources and knowledge, this motivation may
become less attractive to those firms than
during the initial stage of the franchising cycle.
Thus, the present study expects that as
franchisors gain experience with franchising
strategy, the significance of the motivation,
according to the resource scarcity theory (i.e.,
capital constraint), may decline. On the basis of
this rationale, this study argues that the impact
of the motivation from the resource scarcity
theory on the proportion of franchised outlets
to company-owned outlets decreases, as firms
gain franchising experience.
Hypothesis 3: Franchising experience negatively moderates the influence
of motivation derived from the
resource-scarcity theory on the
degree of franchising.
Sharing risk is an essential motivation for
the restaurant industry because the industry is
characteristically risky from highly volatile firm
performance. This riskiness may cause managers
to be more risk-averse, thus prompting firms to
rely heavily on risk-sharing strategies (Combs &
Castrogiovanni, 1994; Hsu et al., 2010; Roh,
2002). Although firms cannot change or mitigate
the level of the industry’s risks created by
macroeconomics, companies can attempt to
stabilize income and consequently minimize the
effect of risks by implementing franchising.
As firms learn more about franchising (i.e., more
experienced), enjoying business stability may
become expected. Time is necessary for realizing
the consequences of franchising with respect to
sharing risks, indicating that the dimension of
time is a significant component of the risk sharing
perspective. For franchisors, who gain experience, becoming less vulnerable to the industry’s
conditions may be a benefit difficult to ignore
or decline. Addressing the time dimension
issue, this study hypothesizes that firms’
experience from franchising increases the

importance of the motivation derived from the
risk-sharing theory.
Hypothesis 4: Franchising experience positively moderates the influence
of motivation derived from the
risk sharing theory on the degree
of franchising.
METHOD
Data
This study collected data from (a) firm
annual reports (10K) from the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission, (b) COMPUSTAT
database, and (c) U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
for consumer price index’s data. From 10Ks,
collection of the number of outlets operated by
franchisees and the firms’ total number of
outlets allows calculation of the degree of
franchising. From the COMPUSTAT database,
information from U.S. publicly traded restaurants’ financial statements allows measuring
various variables by providing financial data,
such as total assets, total revenues, and
liabilities. This study uses consumer price
index data to adjust a firm’s total revenues for
inflation. The sample includes publicly traded
U.S. restaurant companies based on the
standard industrial classification code of 5812.
The range of sampling period is 1991 to 2012
because franchising data prior to 1990 is scarce.
The study identified outliers based on the
criteria of an absolute value for a studentizedresidual of 3 (Kutner, Nachtsheim, Neter, & Li,
2005). After excluding outliers, the sample size
is 449 observations of 64 firms.
Dependent Variable: The Degree of
Franchising
To measure the proportion of a firm’s
franchises, this study focuses on the proportion
of franchising properties, which constitutes
the franchisor’s number of total properties
(Hsu & Jang, 2009). The rationale of using
the proportion of franchising properties to
total properties is consideration of a firm’s
strategic movement in terms of physical expansion through franchising (Sullivan, 1994).
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Interpretation of the ratio of properties offers a
direct indication of a firm’s strategic activity
through franchising.
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Independent Variables
Monitoring Costs. Previous literature
relates monitoring costs to geographic dispersion (Brickley & Dark, 1987; Hsu et al.,
2010). Specifically, wide geographic dispersion
involves increased monitoring costs, such as
travel expenses and monitoring personnel.
If firms operate the dispersed outlets, therefore
they are more likely to franchise the outlets
(Carney & Gedajlovic, 1991; Hsu et al., 2010).
Consequently, the number of states in which
firms have outlets is the proxy for the
monitoring costs.
Resource Scarcity. To test the motivation
derived from the resource scarcity theory, this
study uses credit rating as a proxy for constraints
to capital resources. From the franchisor’s
perspective, one important reason to franchise
is to gain capital from franchisees to expand the
business, overall. Firms that do not have a credit
rating are more likely to have difficulty
expanding because of limited access to
financing debt compared with firms with credit
ratings (Faulkender & Petersen, 2006). In this
sense, this study assigns a variable of 1 to firm
without a credit rating (indicating a firm with
scarce resources) and assigns a variable of 0 to a
firm that has a credit rating.
Firm Risk (Risk). Following Roh (2002)
and Hanson (1992), this study uses variances in
operating cash flow in a 3-year window to
measure risk and to test the effect of risk on
the degree of franchising. According to Brick,
Frierman, and Kim (1998), a lower variance in a
cash flow can signal a distinction between higher
valued firms from lower valued firms. This
identification could arise from a lower variance
in cash flow representing a firm’s stable
operation, which relates to underlying risk.
Franchising Experience (EXP). The study
uses the number of years in the period after a
firm initiated a franchising strategy as a proxy
for franchising experience. As prior previous
literature suggested, if a firm does not clearly
state the time of initiating a franchising strategy,
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this study uses the company’s age as a proxy for
experience (e.g., Combs, Ketchen, & Hoover,
2004). Recently, an increasing number of
studies on organizational learning have incorporated the aspect of time in models because
building experience consists of improvement
and progression over time (Hernes & Irgens,
2013; Lervik, Fahy, & Easterby-Smith, 2010).
The studies argued that to fully understand the
dynamics of building experience, consideration
of time as a dimension of the learning process is
necessary (Berends & Antonacopoulou, 2014).
Control Variables
A significant effect on firm operational
activities as well as a positive effect on firm
performance derives for a firm’s size. The
hospitality literature considers total revenue,
including franchising fees, to be a more
appropriate measure of a franchising firm’s size
(Lee, Singal, & Kang, 2013). A firm’s performance
can also be an important internal factor in the
strategic decision-making process (Ketchen &
Palmer, 1999). Tobin’s q is a commonly acknowledged measure of firm performance (Wernerfelt
& Montgomery, 1988), and this study adopted
a one-year lagged Tobin’s q as a proxy for
performance, based on the rationale that at least
1 year is necessary for performance to influence
strategic decision making.
Model
The purpose of developing the model is to
investigate the moderating effect of franchising
experience on the relation between motivations for franchising as derived from three
theories (i.e., agency theory, resource scarcity
theory, and risk sharing theory) and firms’
degree of franchising. The expectation is that
firms’ gaining experience with a franchising
strategy causes the magnitude of each motivation’s effect on the degree of franchising to
change. Before examining the moderating
effect of franchising experience, the main effect
of franchising experience on the degree of
franchising (i.e., Hypothesis 1) assessed with the
basic model, precedes analysis for remaining
three interactions (i.e., Hypotheses 2 – 4).
Evaluation of the primary interests of this

26

K.-A. SUN & S. LEE

study is according to the main model. The
empirical models are as follows:
Basic model:
DOF ¼ a0 þ a1 States þ a2 CR þ a3 VðOCFÞ
þ a4 EXP þ a5,6 Control variables þ 1
ð1Þ
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Main model:
DOF ¼ b0 þ b1 States þ b2 CR þ b3 VðOCFÞ
þ b4 EXP þ b5 States * EXP þ b6 CR * EXP
þ b7 VðOCFÞ*EXP
þ b8,9 Control variables þ 1
ð2Þ
where DOF represents the degree of franchising; States represents the number of states
where each firm operates outlets, as a proxy
for monitoring costs derived from the agency
theory; CR represents whether a firm has a
credit rating, as a proxy for resource scarcity
derived from the resource scarcity theory; V
(OCF) represents variance of a firm’s operating
cash flow, as a proxy for business risk derived
from the risk sharing theory; EXP represents the
number of years a firm has operated with a
franchising strategy, as a proxy for franchising
experience. Two control variables are firm size
and 1-year lagged Tobin’s q.
In the process of selecting the suitable
method for specification, this study conducted
three tests. Because the analysis uses a panel
dataset, structured with time and firm dimensions, panel data estimation is employed (e.g.,
fixed- or random-effects model) over the pooled
ordinary least squares to avoid biased estimates
that possibly result from the unobserved
heterogeneity (Green, 2008). Conducting the
Hausman test, according to the null hypothesis
that efficient random-effects estimation is as
consistent as fixed-effects estimation (Green,
2008) produced results recommending random-effects model for both the basic and main
models (for the basic model, x2 ¼ 4.29,
p ¼ .5079; for the main model, x2 ¼ 9.85,
p ¼ .1974). To check the necessity
of considering specific firm- or time-effects

in the random-effects estimation, the study
conducted a second test, the Breusch and
Pagan Lagrange multiplier test (Breusch & Pagan,
1980). Nonsignificant results for time-specific
effects (x2 ¼ 2.74 for the basic model and
x2 ¼ 2.53 for the main model) and significant
results for firm-specific effects (x2 ¼ 2136.41
for the basic model and x2 ¼ 1975.23 for the
main model) suggested that one-way randomeffects models by firm are appropriate for both
the basic and the main models. Third, the
Wooldridge test determined embedded serial
correlation in both of the basic and main models
(x2 ¼ 75.91 for the basic model, and
x2 ¼ 71.93 for the main model), and the results
guided the autoregressive model that controls
serial correlations and corrects biased standard
errors (Wooldridge, 2002). On the basis of the
results of the three tests, the first-order
autoregressive (AR[1]) one-way random-effects
model is the choice for analysis of both the basic
and main models.

RESULTS
Summary of Descriptive Analysis
Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics
of franchisors’ data during the period of 1991 to
2012. After collecting data based on the SIC
code, 5812, the study excludes firms having
never implemented franchising and observations for the years firms did not operate a
franchising strategy even if currently they do.
Deleting outliers, identified the absolute value
of studentized residual of 3, resulting in 449
observations of 64 firms. The mean of
proportion of franchised outlets to total outlets
is 49.5%, indicating that almost half of sampled
U.S. operations have been managed by
franchisees during sample period. The minimum degree of franchising is 0.7%, which is the
proportion of Rare Hospitality International in
1998, and the maximum is 100%, which is the
proportion of Wendy’s between 1998 and
2001. Firms have operations in approximately
30 states, and the mean of franchising
experience is 23.6 years. Among the dataset
of 64 firms, 45 firms (364 observations) do not
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TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics
Variable
DOF
States
V(OCF)
EXP
Firm size
Tobin’s q
ln(Tobin’s q)
Credit rating (indicator variable)
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Sample size

M

SD

Minimum

Maximum

0.4948
29.87
602.115
23.6
5.91
0.3418
0.236
1
0
449

0.2981
14.863
6354.9
16.734
1.2166
0.5166
0.336
(364 observation; 45 firms with no credit rating)
(85 observation; 19 firms with credit rating)
(64 firms)

0.007
1
0.00009
1
2.8265
20.709
21.234

1
52
121,168
77
8.7498
3.494
1.503

Note. DOF represents the degree of franchising, franchising revenue divided by firm total revenue; states represents the number of
states where a firm has its operation; V(OCF) represents variance of operating cash flow; EXP represents franchising experience, measured
by the number of years franchising operating; FS represents firm size, measured by log (total revenue).

have credit ratings for the entire sampling
period.
Table 2 summarizes Pearson correlation
among the variables. The dependent variable
(DOF) has significant linear relations with the
number of states, franchising experience (EXP),
and firm size (FS), and a significant association
with a firm’s existent or nonexistent credit
rating (CR). Among the relations, the correlation
between FS and DOF is 20.0956, which
indicates a negative relation between the two
variables. The correlations between independent and control variables does not seem to be
extremely high, which indicates that the
problem of multicollinearity may not exist in
the data analysis.

Model section, first-order autoregressive (AR[1])
one-way random-effects estimation for the two
models (i.e., the basic model in Panel A and
the main model in Panel B) is according to the
results of Hausman test, Lagrange multiplier
test, and Wooldridge test. Both models
conclude significant x2 values (e.g., 52.20 for
the basic model and 60.93 for the main model)
at the level of .01, which suggests overall
significance for the models.
Panel A of Table 3 contains the results of the
basic model, which tests the main effect of
franchising experience and three variables (i.e.,
States, CR, and V(OCF)), derived from three
theoretical backgrounds (i.e., agency theory,
resource scarcity, and risk sharing theory). The
results demonstrate the positive effects of the
number of States (States) and the franchising
experience (EXP) on the degree of franchising
(DOF) at the significance level of .01 for States

Result of Panel Data Estimation
The results of the panel data estimation
appear in Table 3. As addressed earlier in the
TABLE 2. Pearson Correlation Analysis

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

DOF
States
V(OCF)
EXP
FS
Q
CR

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1
0.3904**
0.0808
0.1941**
20.0956*
0.0472
0.1049*

1
0.1119*
0.2103**
0.6391**
0.1774**
0.255**

1
0.0881
0.0620
20.0233
20.0145

1
0.3133**
0.2686**
0.3219**

1
0.2992**
0.4324**

1
0.3804**

1

Note. DOF represents the degree of franchising, franchising revenue divided by firm total revenue; states represents the number of
states where a firm has its operations; V(OCF) represents variance of operating cash flow; EXP represents franchising experience, measured
by the number of years franchising operating; FS represents firm size, measured by log (total revenue); Q represents Tobin’s q; CR represents
an indicator variable assigned 1 if the firm does not have a credit rating, and 0 otherwise.
*p , .05; **p , .01.
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TABLE 3. Results of Main Analysis: Autoregressive One-Way Random Effects
Panel A (basic model)
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Dependent variable: DOF
States
CR
V(OCF)
EXP
FS
Tobin’s q
States £ EXP
CR £ EXP
V(OCF) £ EXP
x2
Adjusted R 2

Coefficient
0.0056**
20.0076
20.0000336
0.0028*
20.0584**
20.0025

Panel B (main model)
z

5.27
20.49
20.9
2.13
25.12
20.15

52.20**
0.3799

Coefficient

z

0.0072**
0.0015
20.000026*
0.0042*
20.0773**
0.0013
20.000045
0.0035
0.0000616*

4.30
0.04
22.30
2.08
25.77
0.08
20.89
0.39
2.28
60.93**
0.3550

Note. DOF represents the degree of franchising, franchising revenue divided by firm total revenue; States represents the umber of
states where a firm has its operations; CR represents credit ratings, a dummy variable, assigned 1 if a firm does not have a credit rating,
otherwise 0; V(OCF) represents business risk, measured by variance of a firm’s operating cash flow; EXP represents franchising experience,
measured by the number of years how long a firm has been operated franchising strategy; FS represents firm size, measured by log (total
revenue).
*p , .05; **p , .01.

and 0.05 for EXP. The positive coefficient of EXP
provides evidence for support of Hypothesis 1
at the 5% significance level.
Panel B of Table 3 displays the results of
the main model which includes the interaction
between franchising experience (EXP) with
States, CR, and V(OCF) and the control
variables. In the main model, the coefficient
of V(OCF) is negative and significant at a 5%
level while coefficients of States and EXP are
significantly positive. However, notably important is that these coefficients do not represent
the main effect. When interaction terms are
present in the model (i.e., States £ EXP, CR
£ EXP, and V(OCF) £ EXP in the case of this
study), coefficients of those noninteraction
terms (i.e., States, CR V(OCF), and EXP) only
represent a slope of one variable of the
interactions when holding the other variable
of the interaction to zero (Friedrich, 1982).
As Friedrich (1982) stated, such coefficients
have little value, because often related
situations are not economically feasible or
meaningful. For testing the hypotheses regarding moderating effects (i.e., Hypotheses 2– 4)
testing, Hypothesis 4 only gains support from
the evidence that franchising experience (EXP)
has a positive moderating effect on the
relationship between variance of operating

cash flow (V(OCF)) and the degree of
franchising (DOF) at the significance level of
0.05. Nonsignificant results of the interaction
effects (i.e., States £ EXP and CR £ EXP) suggest
that Hypothesis 2 and 3 do not have supported
at the significance level of 0.05.
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
This study investigates the changes in
importance of motivations for franchising over
time as firms gain experience with a franchising
strategy. The examination considers the moderating effect of experience with franchising on
the relations between each of three well-known
franchising motivations, derived from the
agency theory, resource scarcity theory, and
risk-sharing theory, and the firm’s degree of
franchising. Experience can explain the details
of firms’ franchising motivations because
the knowledge and know-how that firms build
through operating franchises can influence
firm’s implementation of franchising.
Conducting first-order autoregressive (AR
[1]) one-way random-effects analysis examines
the main and the moderating effect of
franchising experience, measured by the
number of years firms initiated franchising
strategies. Since franchising experience closely
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relates to the time dimension and other
variables form a panel dataset, a critical
consideration is simultaneous examination of
panel and time-series data analysis to prevent
unobserved heterogeneity and serial correlation. The models used in this study are
expected to alleviate the potential estimation
issues, and produce unbiased and consistent
results.
This study, first, proposes a positive effect
of franchising experience on firms’ degree of
franchising, and findings support that hypothesis.
The results demonstrate that the longer firms’
involvement in franchising strategies, the more
likely an increase in the proportion of franchised
outlets to the total outlets will increase. On the
basis of the results, the study suggests that as firms
gain familiarity with franchising strategies through
experience, motivation to expand through
franchising strategies tends to increase, rather
than to grow through owned outlets. Specifically,
management through a franchising strategy offers
opportunities for franchisors to build knowledge,
such as appropriate interaction with franchisees
and also gain know-hows for maximizing benefit
from franchising to improve overall business
performance. Experienced firms are more
familiar with the strategy, providing a motive for
enlarging business by using franchising. Thus, it is
important to note that franchising experience
becomes another significant motivation for
increasing the use of the strategy.
Second, the study’s results identify the
moderating effect of franchising experience
on motivation to franchise. The significant and
positive interaction between franchising experience and risk-sharing motivation (Hypothesis 4)
provides evidence that franchising experience
positively moderates the impact of risk-sharing
motivation on firms’ propensity to franchise.
Risk-sharing through franchising, arguably,
becomes more important as firms gain
familiarity with the strategy. Once firms initiate
franchising, they tend to increase the degree
of franchising when facing increased risks in
business. The results suggest that experience
from franchising educates franchisors regarding
the significant importance of the risk-sharing
from the strategy.
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Conversely, the nonsignificant interactions
between experience and the other two
motivations, derived from the agency theory
and the resource scarcity theory, indicate that
experience from franchising has no influence
on the relations between these motivations and
the degree of franchising. The positive and
significant coefficient of the number of states in
the basic model (Panel A of Table 3) indicates
that reducing agency costs is a critical
motivation for franchisors, and that motivation
does not change as the franchisors gain
familiarity with the strategy (i.e., the nonsignificant moderating effect of franchising
experience for this motivation; Panel B of
Table 3). The nonsignificant results regarding
the resource scarcity motivation (Panel A and
Panel B) suggest that firms’ motivation to
franchise to attain resources outside of the
firms is nonexistent and that motivation
remains unchanged despite firms’ increased
experience with franchising.
The present study contributes to the
franchising literature by incorporating the
time-dimension into traditional views of
motivations for franchising. Specifically, the
study offers the opportunity to understand the
importance of experience from franchising
with respect to long-run motivations to institute
franchising strategies. Although risk-sharing has
had consideration in previous literature (Combs
& Castrogiovanni, 1994; Hsu et al., 2010; Roh,
2002), empirical support for this motivation has
remained undiscovered despite rigorous statistical analyses. Findings of the present study
illuminate this issue: The static view for this
motivation is not appropriate, but the dynamic
perspective is valuable when considering the
risk-sharing motivation to franchise. The
dynamic view demonstrates that risk-sharing
significantly motivates franchisors to expand
business through franchising strategies;
Although the main effect of risk-sharing on the
degree of franchising was not found in the
present study, when considering a long-term
perspective, the moderating effect of franchising experience guides the conclusion that the
risk-sharing motivation becomes stronger and
significant over the long-term as a result of
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familiarity with franchising. These results
provide an empirical support for the proposition of Martin and Justis (1993) that
franchising is an efficient long-term strategy.
This study contributes to business contexts
by providing practitioners with several practical
implications. The finding that risk-sharing
becomes a significant motivation for franchisors
as gaining more franchising experiences
provides franchisees or prospected franchisees
with valuable insight which cannot be underestimated. The results suggest that great
familiarity with the franchising strategy causes
franchisors to be more likely to minimize
business risk by sharing risks with franchisees.
The contracts with franchisors may include
terms and conditions reflecting the goal. Thus,
franchisees must carefully review agreements
for greater responsibility arising from business
activities, especially in risky environments.
In the same vein, it could be helpful for
government agencies (e.g., Federal Trade
Commission) or legislators who try to prevent
anticompetitive business practices to recognize
that franchisees can be unfairly treated
regarding this situation and to consider legal
options available for franchisees. The findings
offer information for investors and analysts in
the financial markets. It can be implied that as
franchisors become more experienced the
franchising strategy, they may become more
knowledgeable that franchising strategy possibly reduces their business risk. That is, more
experienced franchisors are likely to understand and be more confident that implementing the franchising strategy can mitigate their
business risk. They may consider the franchising
strategy as one of the risk management
practices. Significantly, a firm’s commitment to
the franchising, based on the length of time
franchisors have used the strategy to mitigate
risks, is a valuable benchmark for investors and
analysts seeking additions to portfolios.
LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTED FUTURE
RESEARCH
The study has limitations: First, to choose a
proxy for experience with franchising, this study

counts the number of years that franchisors
implemented the strategy inducing the aspect
of time and demonstrating the value of
established knowledge (e.g., Hernes, & Irgens,
2013; Lervik, Fahy, & Easterby-Smith, 2010).
However, just considering the period of
franchising may not fully reflect or represent
the degree of experience with franchising for
each firm because the speed and quality of
learning can differ. Future studies may attempt
to develop another proxy that can provide
more a representative measuring from franchising. Second, identifying clearly a year for initial
implementation year, this study, following
previous literature, used the company’s age
as a proxy for gaining franchising experience
(Combs et al., 2004). Despite the basis from
prior studies, potential errors in measurement
exist and future studies should improve upon
measurement of franchising experience seeking
more information. Last, a caution is necessary
when generalizing this study’s findings to other
industries because findings of this study may be
specific to the restaurant industry. A replication
of the present study’s method in different
industries that practice franchising would
increase external validity of this study’s
findings.
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